The day South Africa decided to keep quiet on the Sudan Genocide

On February 19, 2026, the United Nations (UN) released a report that used language of historic consequence. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) siege of Sudan’s El Fasher, investigators found, displayed “hallmarks of genocide” against the Zaghawa and Fur communities.

The evidence was specific: mass executions at multiple sites across the city. Systematic sexual violence. An eighteen-month blockade that deliberately starved the population before the assault even began.

The UN report argues the evidence supports multiple Genocide Convention acts, including killings, serious bodily or mental harm, and the deliberate infliction of conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction.

Government had a choice

On the same day, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa issued a formal tribute to the pioneering Palestinian diplomat Leila Shahid, who passed away at the age of 76.

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) described her as a “distinguished voice for justice” and highlighted several milestones of her career, which admittedly included many. 

The South African government noted that Shahid’s death occurred while they remained “resolute in solidarity” with the Palestinian struggle, a stance reflected in South Africa’s ongoing legal challenges regarding international law. 

But no statement from DIRCO on the UN genocide finding. No press conference. No word from the Presidency. I looked everywhere. 24 hours later… bupkis.

Just a condolence notice on a completely different crisis. By February 20, that silence had become the loudest statement South Africa could make.

The contradiction nobody’s discussing

For context, six months prior, on October 12, 2025, South Africa’s government had been clear about what it thought of RSF violence.

DIRCO issued a statement, noting that “assaults on civilian infrastructure have resulted in a tragic loss of innocent lives, severe injuries, displacement, and immense human suffering.” Those attacks in El Fasher killed at least 20 people.

Then came February 19, 2026. UN human rights reporting, cited by the Associated Press (AP) put the death toll at more than 6,000 over three days in late October 2025. It claims the RSF had done so specifically targeting non-Arab ethnic groups. And that the killing, combined with the eighteen-month siege, constituted genocide.

Again. South Africa’s government was quiet.

This silence may not have been accidental. It may be a political stance. Darfur is complicated, and it comes with history, after all.

But we’re not isolated in our inertia in this. Sky News Arabia (SNA) has faced severe international and domestic criticism, including formal accusations from the Sudanese government and human rights groups of “whitewashing” the genocide in Darfur. Critics allege the channel serves as a media façade for the UAE, which owns 50% of the station and is the primary alleged military backer of the RSF. 

The BRICS bind explains a lot

Here is what South Africa is skittish around: the United Arab Emirates has faced sustained allegations from multiple investigations and rights organizations of supplying weapons to the RSF. 

The UAE denies this. But the allegation has shaped global diplomatic pressure on the RSF’s backers for months.

The problem for South Africa is that the UAE has been a BRICS member since January 1, 2024.

In January 2026, South Africa’s Navy hosted the “Will of Peace” naval exercises, a sort of BRICS+ flex. Participants included China, Russia, Iran, and South Africa. New member UAE did not directly participate in the naval drills themselves.

The timing is suspicious. South Africa hosted military exercises with nations in the framework that includes the country accused of supplying the RSF, then, weeks later, remained silent when the UN confirmed that the RSF had committed genocide.

If South Africa had echoed the UN’s genocide framing, it would have raised immediate political questions about external backers and arms flows. Those questions would have to point at the UAE. And the UAE is now part of the club.

I get it. Sometimes, when something stinks, we look away.

A pattern of selective silence

Let’s take a minute and compare. How does South Africa frame different crises? Gaza receives coverage anchored in law: an ICJ case, its own Genocide Convention, AND international justice. 

The goal is framed as seeking legally binding rulings, reparations, and the enforcement of international criminal law. 

Sudan receives coverage anchored in logistics: displacement numbers, famine, humanitarian access. The government calls for the “unhindered opening of humanitarian corridors,” respect for humanitarian law, and “Sudanese-led political settlements.”

And, despite the UN Fact-Finding Mission concluding that acts in Sudan bear the “hallmarks of genocide,” South Africa has not pursued similar legal action at the ICJ against the RSF or its alleged backers. 

One is framed as a legal crisis requiring accountability. The other as a humanitarian tragedy requiring charity.

This is far from accidental. It’s how selective morality operates.

The moral gymnastics of it all

South Africa has positioned itself as the global custodian of the Genocide Convention. The government likes to lecture the world about universal accountability. 

But when that standard arrives at South Africa’s doorstep, when a genocide finding lands on the AU’s mandate, in Africa, affecting South Africa’s own continental leadership, the government goes quiet.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) and human rights groups such as Africa Rights Monitor have accused the government of “moral gymnastics” and protecting its BRICS+ partner, the UAE, from accountability.

Again, at the AU Summit on February 14, Ramaphosa spoke about Sudan. But he did not call the atrocities genocide. He called for the “cessation of hostilities” and “humanitarian access.” Generic language. Safe. Like someone trying not to offend a trading partner.

The UAE is described by DIRCO itself as South Africa’s largest market in the Middle East. DIRCO maintains that relationship as a priority. Naming the UAE’s alleged arms flows to the RSF would strain that relationship in ways the government has chosen not to risk.

The mechanism South Africa prefers not to use

The African Union has a legal tool designed exactly for this moment. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act allows the Union to intervene in a member state in cases of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity.

Under Article 4(h), the African Union is granted “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”

This article was specifically drafted to prevent a repeat of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, signaling that the AU would no longer stand by while mass atrocities were committed on the continent

The AU Peace and Security Council can recommend intervention. But this requires broad support among heads of state to move forward.

On February 11, 2026, during the 48th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council in Addis Ababa, South Africa was officially elected by member states to serve a two-year term on the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC). 

In theory, South Africa could lead a push to invoke this mechanism. It could use its continental voice to demand accountability.

In practice, it probably won’t. Because Egypt, which supports the Sudanese Armed Forces, is also influential in the AU. Also, the UAE and its BRICS+ membership. And invoking the mechanism would require South Africa to publicly identify which regional powers are arming which side.

Awkward.

What others are doing while government watches

On February 9, 2026, Amnesty International delivered an oral statement to the 61st session of the UN Human Rights Council, describing the situation in El Fasher as a “stain on our collective conscience”.

The Centre for Human Rights at the University of Pretoria hosted a webinar titled “El Fasher’s Unspoken Disaster: Siege, Starvation, and the Weaponisation of Hunger” to examine the crisis as a critical test case for international humanitarian law.

This is the gap South Africa has created. The legal frameworks exist. The continental platform exists. The voice that the world listens to exists. But the government deploys that voice selectively. Loudly on Gaza, carefully on Sudan, depending on which relationships matter more.

What this means

The people of El Fasher do not have time for BRICS diplomacy. Nearly 6,000 people were erased in three days while the world’s self-appointed ‘custodian of the Genocide Convention’ looked the other way to protect a trade balance. In the hierarchy of human rights, it appears some victims are a legal priority, while others are merely a diplomatic inconvenience.

The UN has confirmed all of this. On the day the UN officially named the evidence, South Africa’s government released a condolence statement about an entirely different crisis.

It’s a choice. South African silence tells everyone exactly how much principles are worth when they cost something.